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I.

Introduction
On August 22, 2002, Ariel Castro kidnapped Michelle Knight.1
For 11 years, he imprisoned Michelle at his house, tortured her, raped
her, impregnated her several times, and brutally forced her to miscarry.2
On May 6, 2013, Michelle and her two fellow victims, Georgina
“Gina” DeJesus and Amanda Berry, finally managed to escape.3
On July 26, 2013, Castro pled guilty to 937 counts of rape,
kidnapping, and aggravated murder in order to avoid the death penalty.4
On August 1, 2013, just before Judge Michael Russo sentenced
Castro to life in prison without parole plus 1000 years, the three victims
were permitted to give victim-impact statements.5 Here is what Michelle
Knight said (in part):
. . . You took 11 years from my life, but I've got my life back!
I spent 11 years in hell. Now your hell is just beginning. I will
overcome all that happened, but you're going to face hell for
eternity! From this moment on, I am NOT going to let you
define me or affect who I am. I will live on but you will die a
little more inside each day as you think of those 11 years and
the atrocities you inflicted on us. What does God think of you
hypocritically going to church each Sunday and then coming
home to torture us? The death penalty would be the easy way
out; you don't deserve that! We want you to spend the rest of
your life in prison! . . .6

1

See Erin Donaghue, Michelle Knight, Cleveland kidnapping victim, to Ariel
Castro:
"Your
hell
is
just
beginning",
Aug.
1,
2013,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michelle-knight-cleveland-kidnapping-victimto-ariel-castro-your-hell-is-just-beginning/.
2
Id.
3
See Michael Muskal, Ariel Castro gets life, no parole; victim says his hell
awaits, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nnariel-castro-michelle-knight-20130801,0,2844274.story#axzz2r2LCAkQc.
4
See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ariel Castro pleads guilty to 937 counts in Ohio
kidnapping
case,
July
26,
2013,
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20130726-ariel-castropleads-guilty-to-937-counts-in-ohio-kidnapping-case.ece.
5
See Donaghue, supra note 1.
6
See Statements on behalf of Amanda Berry, Gina DeJesus and Michelle Knight,
Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/statements-on-behalf-
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Vengeful words indeed. To see just how vengeful they are,
imagine that the governor of a northeastern state who had presidential
ambitions emailed the following similar statements to a defiant mayor:
Now your hell is just beginning. I will overcome your slight,
but you're going to face hell for eternity! From this moment
on, I am NOT going to let you win. I will live on but you will
die a little more inside each day as you think of your insolence.
Imagine also that the mayor then leaked this email to the media. What
would happen to the governor? Almost everybody would roundly
condemn him, and his political life – certainly his presidential ambitions
– would die a swift death. This kind of vengeful language is simply
unacceptable from a governor.
But if it is unacceptable from a governor, shouldn’t it be
unacceptable from any individual? Shouldn’t we equally condemn
Michelle Knight? After all, Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for 16
more years than Michelle and never said anything nearly as vengeful
about his racist captors.7 Why couldn’t Michelle Knight have risen to the
same heights as Mandela? Shouldn’t we denounce her for saying such
hateful things to her captor?8

of-amanda-berry-gina-dejesus-and-michelle-knight-217977801.html.
7
See Barbara Mutch, Mandela taught the power of forgiveness: Column, Dec. 8,
2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/12/08/nelson-mandela-remembercolumn/3896245/; Justice Malala, 'Mandela looked his enemy in the eye and
held
him
close',
Dec.
7,
2013,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/nelsonmandela/10501060/Mandela-looked-his-enemy-in-the-eye-and-held-himclose.html.
8
Opponents of victim-impact statements offer two main arguments. First, they
argue that victim-impact statements debase the criminal justice system by
permitting, if not encouraging, victims and their families not to forgive but to do
the very opposite – express their ugliest, most vengeful sentiments. Indeed, for
this reason, victim-impact statements have been derogatorily characterized as
“institutionalized revenge.” See Catherine Guastello, Victim Impact Statements:
Institutionalized Revenge, 37 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1321 (2005); see also Michael Price,
Revenge and the People Who Seek It: New Research Offers Insight into the
Dish
Best
Served
Cold,
THE
MONITOR,
June
2009,
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/06/revenge.aspx (“Victim impact statements .
. . can partially satisfy a victim's vengeful feelings while also putting the
responsibility for punishment on the state . . .”); Brian Rosebury, Private
Revenge and its Relation to Punishment, 21 UTILITAS 1, 11 (2009) (“[A]
suspicion of [revenge’s] presence hangs over some recent developments in
criminal justice doctrines. One example is the introduction of ‘victim impact
statements’ in some jurisdictions.”) (citations omitted). Second, opponents of
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While a very small number of people might answer this last
question in the affirmative, most would not. Instead, they would insist
that Michelle was perfectly justified in saying and thinking what she did,
that she had every right to wish eternal suffering on the man who had
cruelly and callously inflicted such suffering on her for his own pleasure.
So counterbalancing our tendency to condemn vengeance in the abstract
is our tendency to adopt the very opposite position when we learn of the
particular circumstances that justify it.9 The task of this paper is to show
that harmful criminal wrongdoing is just such a circumstance and
therefore that, contrary to popular wisdom, vengeance plays a legitimate
and central role in the criminal justice system.
The theory of retributivism is sometimes thought to capture this
point of view. But this perception is not quite right. The relationship
between retributivism and revenge is much more complicated, as I hope
to show. Retributivism is the theory that (a) we punish criminals in order
to give them what they deserve (b) because this result is inherently good,

victim-impact statements argue that they are unfair to defendants. While these
statements bear no relevance to defendants’ blameworthiness, they play on
judges’ and juries’ emotions and thereby manipulate them into increasing
defendants’ sentences. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860-61 (1991) (J.
Stevens dissenting) (“[A]spects of the character of the victim unforeseeable to
the defendant at the time of his crime are irrelevant the defendant's ‘personal
responsibility and moral guilt’ and therefore cannot justify a death sentence.”)
(citations omitted); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony
and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 421-22 (2003)
(“[C]ommentators are particularly concerned that victim impact statements
highlight the perceived relative worth of the victim, and consequently that the
jury's judgment about whether to impose the death sentence will be influenced
by this inappropriate factor. . . . [T]he death reflects neither the murderer's
mental state nor the morality of the act itself. In addition, victim impact
statements detail the various harms that befall the victim or the victim's family
after a crime . . . that a defendant might not have been able to foresee at the time
of the crime.”) (citations omitted). This criticism of victim-impact statements is
part of a more general debate about whether the harm a person causes should be
factored into her blame or punishment because it was a matter of “outcome
luck” – something outside her control and therefore something that arguably
should not affect her desert. For two opposing views, see Bebhinn Donnelly,
Sentencing and Consequences: A Divergence Between Blameworthiness and
Liability to Punishment, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 392 (2007); and Ken Levy, The
Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as Punishable as
the Wrongful Action That Causes It, 24 L. & PHIL. 263 (2005).
9
Cf. Anders Kaye, Powerful Particulars: The Real Reason the Behavioral
Sciences Threaten Criminal Responsibility, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 539 passim
(2010) (arguing that particular details about an individual’s psychology and past
victimhood tend to motivate sympathy more effectively than abstract theories
about determinism and responsibility).
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an end that is justified in itself.10 Retributivism is usually contrasted with
consequentialism, which suggests that we punish criminals in order to
bring about a good result beyond, or instead of, merely giving criminals
their just deserts:
protecting society against more crimes by
incapacitating them (through incarceration or, in rare cases, death);
discouraging them from repeating the same kinds of crimes after release
(specific deterrence and possibly rehabilitation); and discouraging others
in society from committing similar crimes (general deterrence).11
There is also a third theory – expressivism – which suggests that
we punish criminals in order to express our moral disapproval of their
criminal behavior. Punishment is the best, if not the only, “language”
through which we may blame individuals for violating the criminal law,
communicate the gravity of the criminals’ wrongdoing to offenders, and
thereby affirm the moral and criminal-legal norms of the community.12

10

See DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 87 (2008); MICHAEL
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 87-88,
111 (1997); David Dolinko, Punishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 403, 406 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds.,
2011); R.A. Duff & David Garland, Introduction: Thinking about Punishment,
in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 1, 7 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994);
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955). Some
opponents of retributivism include: Russell Christopher, Deterring
Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843
(2002); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17
(2003); Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, 82 PHIL. STUD. 289
(1996); Brian Slattery, The Myth of Retributive Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND
ITS CRITICS 27 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); Mark Thornton, Against
Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra, at 83; James Q.
Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (2003).
11
See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414 (2000); MOORE,
supra note 10, at 91; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 405-06; Duff & Garland, supra
note 10, at 8. For critiques of both retributivism and consequentialism, see
BOONIN, supra note 4, at 37-154.
12
See BOONIN, supra note 4, at 183; R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY xvii, xviii-xix (2001); DOUGLAS HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 93-94 (2008);
MOORE, supra note 10, at 84-85; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 48-49 (1976); Duff & Garland, supra note 10, at 8;
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in A READER ON
PUNISHMENT, supra note 10, at 73, 74; Jean Hampton, The Moral Education
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 212 (1984); Robert F. Schopp,
Mental Illness, Police Power Interventions, and the Expressive Functions of
Punishment, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 99, 109-13;
Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON
PUNISHMENT, supra note 10, at 118-27. For critiques of expressivism, see
HUSAK, supra, at 88; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 417-20; D.B. Hershenov,
Restitution and Revenge, 96 J. PHIL. 79, 85-86 (1999). For a very helpful
summary of consequentialism, retributivism, and expressivism and potential
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Every infliction of criminal punishment expresses three points: (a) the
subject of punishment committed wrongdoing; (b) the subject is at least
criminally, if not morally, responsible for this wrongdoing; and (c) the
subject should be condemned for her criminal behavior. It may plausibly
be argued that expressivism ultimately reduces to a combination of the
two main theories in play – retributivism (giving criminals their just
deserts) and consequentialism (for educative effect).13 But whether or
not this reductive hypothesis is true, the virtue of expressivism is that it
captures moral censure and stigmatization, two essential components of
criminal punishment.14
Regarding retributivism, the central topic of this Article, I will
argue that it is only partly correct. While retributivism helps both to
explain and to justify criminal punishment, it cannot completely fulfill
both of these tasks – explanation and justification – on its own. Instead,
it must be supplemented by what is usually considered to be its principal
competitor15 – again, consequentialism. In this way, my paper is
ultimately a plea for rapprochement. The war between retributivism and
consequentialism has gone on long enough. This Article will attempt to
hammer out the terms of a lasting peace treaty.16

problems with each, see DUFF, supra, at 3-34. For a list of purposes that do not
fall cleanly into any one of these three categories (retributivism,
consequentialism, or expressivism), see FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,
THE
GENEALOGY OF MORALS 80-81 (Walter Kaufmann tr. 1989 [1887]).
13
See Dolinko, supra note 10, at 421; Hampton, supra note 12, at 212-13; Jean
Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS
CRITICS, supra note 10, at 1, 13, 14 (1992); Eric Jaffe, The Complicated
Psychology of Revenge, OBSERVER, Oct. 2011,
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/2011/octo
ber-11/the-complicated-psychology-of-revenge.html; J.L. Mackie, Morality and
the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4-5 (1982).
14
See HUSAK , supra note 12, at 93; Douglas Husak, The De Minimis
“Defence” to Criminal Liability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL
LAW 328, 349-50 (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011).
15
See generally DUFF, supra note 12, at 3; Christopher, supra note 10, at 85565; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 408-09.
16
Many courts and scholars have advocated “mixed” or “hybrid” theories of
punishment. See, e.g., Tapia v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011); DUFF, supra
note 12, at xvii; FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 418; H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 9 (2008 (2d ed.));
HUSAK, supra note 12, at 203-05; MOORE, supra note 10, at 92-94; VON HIRSCH,
supra note 6, at 49-55; Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of
Punishment, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 30-31 (2003); Douglas Husak,
Why Punish the Deserving? 26 NOÛS 447, 452 (1992) [hereinafter Husak, Why
Punish]; Douglas Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
959, 971-77 (2000) [hereinafter Husak, Retribution]; Dan Markel, Against
Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (2004); Alice Ristroph, Desert,
Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1298

7

The war between consequentialism and retributivism has been
fueled by three kinds of mischievous thought-experiments, hypotheticals
in which highly unusual conditions are stipulated in such a way that the
two theories’ different goals – backward-looking just deserts and
forward-looking good consequences – end up opposing each other: (a)
bad consequences result
from punishing criminals,17 (b) good
consequences result from punishing innocent individuals,18 and (c) good

(2006). But see MOORE, supra note 10, at 94, 97-102 (arguing that mixed
theories fail because retributivism does all the work and consequentialism either
interferes with this work or gratuitously free-rides on it); Christopher, supra note
10, at 869 (“The difficulty for most mixed theories is that either substantive
issues of justification are assumed away by definition or the instability of the
components leads to a collapse back into consequentialism. While [H.L.A.]
Hart’s mixed theory may avoid those problems, its own difficulty is in setting
the amount of punishment.”) (citations omitted); Donald Dripps, Fundamental
Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56
VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1390-91 (2003) (“The comforting consistency of utilitarian
and retributive theories with respect to most practical issues may be a cognitive
illusion.”). For a survey and critique of different mixed theories, see Dolinko,
supra note 10, at 421-27.
17
Punishment “abolitionists” – people who believe that criminal punishment
does (much) more harm than good – rely on these kinds of examples.
Abolitionists include: BOONIN, supra note 4, at 213-75; H. Bianchi, Abolition:
Assensus and Sanctuary, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 10, at 336,
336-39; Eugene E. Dais, Commentary: Positive Retributivism and Despicable
Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 10, at 107; see also
Husak, Why Punish, supra note 16, at 448-49 (arguing that, in several different
kinds of situations, an offender should not be punished even though he deserves
it because the consequences of punishing him would be too costly); Husak,
Retribution, supra note 16, at 975-76 (“Retributivists . . . seemingly suppose that
their task is complete when they show that the punishment of culpable
wrongdoers is intrinsically good . . . But this demonstration does not suffice to
justify the institution of punishment – even for retributivists. They must show
not only that giving culpable wrongdoers what they deserve is intrinsically
valuable, but also that it is sufficiently valuable to offset the drawbacks that
inevitably result when an institution of punishment is created. . . . My point is
that the value of realizing retributive justice, by itself, is insufficient to justify
the creation of an institution of punishment with [several] formidable
drawbacks.”) (citations omitted).
18
See J.J.C. SMART, An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics, in
UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST 69-72 (J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD
WILLIAMS, 1973); Rawls, supra note 10, at 9-13; MOORE, supra note 10, at 93
n.19, 94-97; WILFRID J. WALUCHOW, THE DIMENSIONS OF ETHICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICAL THEORY 166-68 (2003); Hampton, supra note 12, at
214; Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and
Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 118 (2000); Christopher,
supra note 10, at 870-80, 922-23.
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consequences result from not punishing criminals.19 The idea behind all
three thought-experiments is to show that consequentialism (good
consequences) and retributivism (just deserts) can come into conflict and
therefore that we must choose one over the other. It is certainly true that
these three kinds of situations can drive a wedge between retributivism
and consequentialism. As long as two different ethical theories of any
kind have two different primary goals, there will always be ways to bring
these goals – and therefore these theories – into conflict. But the fact
that retributivism and consequentialism can come into conflict hardly
shows that they do not usually work together. On the contrary, that is
exactly what retributivism and consequentialism do – usually work
together.
In fact, retributivism not only works well with consequentialism;
it needs consequentialism. There are three reasons. In Part III, I will
provide the first two reasons. Both of these reasons start from the fact
that retributivism is as much in need of explanation as the thing that it is
trying to explain (criminal punishment). The notion that the state should
give criminals the punishment that they deserve requires further
explanation because retributivists do not also believe that the state should
give good people the praise or rewards that they deserve for their
virtuous acts. So why do retributivists think that it is imperative that the
state inflict negative desert but not bestow positive desert? Simply
stating, as retributivism does, that we should give people their just
deserts just does not answer this question. The concept of just deserts is
neutral between negative and positive desert and therefore fails to
explain retributivism’s asymmetrical emphasis on negative desert.
I will argue that there are two reasons why retributivists believe
that the state should inflict negative desert rather than guarantee positive
desert, and both reasons are consequentialist. The first reason is that
inflicting negative desert is much more practicable than guaranteeing
positive desert. Difficult as the task of law enforcement may be, it is
much easier to find, arrest, prosecute, convict, and punish them than it
would be for the state to seek out the much larger number of virtuous
people and give them the praise and rewards that they deserve. The
second reason is what I will refer to as the Motivation Thesis. The
Motivation Thesis says that, whether or not retributivists admit it (to
themselves, no less to others), retributivism is largely motivated by
vengeance; that retributivists’ desire for retributive justice, for giving
criminals their just deserts, is itself motivated by the (deeper) desire to
give criminals a taste of their own medicine, to pay them back for the
unjustified and unexcused harm that they have caused.20 And, as a

19

See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Vol.
2) 193 (1988 [1781]); see generally MOORE, supra note 10, at 100-01;
Christopher, supra note 10, at 858 n.66; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 406-07.
20
See JEFFRIE MURPHY, Hatred: a qualified defense, in FORGIVENESS AND

9

motivation, vengeance (or the channeling of vengeful feelings, which is
sometimes euphemized as “victim closure”) is consequentialist, not
retributivist, because we act on it in order to achieve a good consequence
– namely, annulling the crime (or turning the crime back on the criminal)
and thereby achieving a restoration of the moral and social order, which
itself contributes to the victim’s sense that the criminal’s wrongdoing has
been at least partly righted.21
Most retributivists are reluctant to admit that retributive justice is
motivated by vengeance largely because they fail to realize that
vengeance can be not only justified but justificatory.22 And they fail to
achieve this realization because vengeance has a bad reputation.23 Once
again, it is generally thought to be just plain wrong, a feeling that should
not be indulged but rather repudiated in favor of its angelical opposite –
forgiveness.24 So to suggest that vengeance can actually be justified or
justify criminal punishment will strike many as not only misguided but

MERCY 95 (JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, 1988); Leo Zaibert,
Punishment and Revenge, 25 L. & PHIL. 81, 115 (2006).
21
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010); CHARLES K.B. BARTON,
GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM OF JUSTICE 10 (1999); GEORGE FLETCHER,
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 37-38 (1998); JEAN HAMPTON, The
Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 20, at 111, 125, 13031; MURPHY, supra note 14, at 89; Theodore M. Benditt, Revenge, 38 THE PHIL.
F. 357, 358, 362 (2007); Bradley, supra note 16, at 29-30; Alan Brudner, In
Defence of Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 10, at
93 passim; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 416-17; John Finnis, Retribution:
Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 97, 103 (1999); George
Fletcher, What Is Punishment Imposed For? 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101,
104, 109 (1994); Hershenov, supra note 12, at 80, 87-88; Matthew Jones,
Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of the
Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031, 1045, 1048-49 (2003); Markel, supra
note 16, at 1446-47.
22
See BOONIN, supra note 4, at 152; Mackie, supra note 13, at 3; Rosebury,
supra note 8, at 11.
23
See BARTON, supra note 21, at xiv, 1-2, 9; PETER A FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF
VENGEANCE x (2001); MURPHY, supra note 14, at 90; Rosebury, supra note 8, at
20. But see ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY
WE ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 339 (1994)
(suggesting that the “impulse of retribution” is surrounded by an “aura of
reverence” and is imbued with “the ethereal sense that [it] embodies some
higher ethical truth”).
24
See BARTON, supra note 21, at 2; MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH, BEYOND
REVENGE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE FORGIVENESS INSTINCT xix (2008); JEFFRIE
MURPHY, Introduction, The retributive emotions, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY,
supra note 20, at 1, 4; David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice
System: If It Belongs, Then Why Is It So Hard to Find? 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1663, 1663-64, 1666-67 (2000).
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also wicked and pathological.25 Still, this perception is wrong. We
retributivists need to do better damage control. We should no longer be
reluctant to articulate our theory of criminal punishment in terms of
vengeance. In Part IV, then, I will supplement the Motivation Thesis
with what I call the Justification Thesis. The Justification Thesis says
that the desire to exact revenge against criminals for the harm that they
cause is not an unfortunate, irrational disposition lodged deep in our
psyches but rather both a morally appropriate reaction and a perfectly
decent and honorable motivation for criminal punishment.26
Finally, in Part VI, I will present the last of the three reasons
why retributivism needs consequentialism: retributivism does a better
job of explaining and justifying criminal punishment for harmful crimes
than for harmless (or victimless) crimes such as drug possession,
resisting arrest, insider trading, and counterfeiting.27 While it is true that
retributivists believe that people who commit crimes, harmful or
harmless, should be punished, the primary explanation and justification
of the infliction of criminal punishment for harmless crimes is
consequentialism. Retributivism plays a much smaller role.

II.

The Main Goals of the Criminal Justice System
The three primary goals of the criminal justice system are to give
criminals the punishment that they deserve,28 minimize crime,29 and
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See BARTON, supra note 21, at xiv.
Since the late 1980s and especially in the last fifteen years, some scholars are
finally admitting this point: BARTON, supra note 21, at xv, 30; MOORE, supra
note 10, at 117-18, 141-44; MURPHY, supra note 14, at 90; STEVEN PINKER, THE
BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 532 (2011);
WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 339; Hershenov, supra note 12, at 90. Even the
United States Supreme Court accepts this point. See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2028;
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 (2007).
27
As I will briefly argue in Part VI, the classic inchoate crimes – attempt,
conspiracy, and solicitation – often inflict psychological harm even when they
do not inflict physical harm. In support of this point, see R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL
ATTEMPTS 130 (1996); Anthony M. Dillof, Modal Retributivism: A Theory of
Sanctions for Attempts and Other Criminal Wrongs, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 647,
662 (2011); Susan Hanley Duncan, Myspace Is Also Their Space: Ideas for
Keeping Children Safe From Sexual Predators on Social-Networking Sites, 96
KY. L.J. 527, 542 (2007-08); Hershenov, supra note 12, at 87.
28
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
29
See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Many criminal scholars suggest
that the primary purpose of the criminal justice system is crime prevention. See,
e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN (WITH STEPHEN
MORSE). CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2009);
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 30-31
(2006). But prevention, which connotes success, is less accurate a term than
deterrence or minimization for the simple reason that, in spite of the existence of
26
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thereby express serious moral condemnation of criminals for their
criminal acts.30 There is no need to decide which of the first two goals is
more important. It is perfectly acceptable to maintain that they are both
equally important, at least when it comes to punishing harmful (as
opposed to harmless) crimes. As I mentioned in the Introduction, one of
the central points of this Article is to end the unnecessary war between
these two positions and recognize that they generally work beautifully
together.
A.

The First Primary Goal of the Criminal Justice System: Crime
Minimization

Regarding the first goal, why do we want to minimize crime in
the first place? In a previous paper, I offered this answer:
The criminal law is largely concerned with protecting people
against deliberately inflicted harm to their supremely valued
interests, to the interests that they generally most highly
value—namely life, physical well-being, emotional well-being,
family, liberty, and property. That is why we have criminal
laws against homicide, manslaughter, rape, assault, battery,
kidnapping, unlawful imprisonment, and theft.31
Of course, there are other criminal offenses that do not necessarily harm
the supremely valued interests listed above – for example, reckless
endangerment, solicitation, conspiracy, and attempt. But what justifies
legislatures in defining these acts as crimes is the same kind of goal:
protecting our supremely valued interests against acts that not only do
damage to our supremely valued interests but also tend or threaten to
damage one or more of our supremely valued interests.32 For the same
reason, public order or tranquility should not be included in the list of
supremely valued interests. Instead, it should be included in another list,
the list of lesser or secondarily valued interests. Its inferior status
explains why such victimless crimes as disturbing the peace (or

a criminal justice system, crime still occurs.
30
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
31
Ken Levy, The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: The Common Link
Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1065
(2007). When protected by the state, these supremely valued interests are called
rights.
32
See DUFF, supra note 27, at 134-35; HART, supra note 16, at 6; see also
Bradley, supra note 16, at 25-26 (offering a slightly different account). Because
some crimes are harmless and do not tend to cause harm – for example, drug
possession, resisting arrest, insider trading, and counterfeiting – their
criminalization warrants a different justification. These kinds of crimes will be
addressed more fully below in Part VI.
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disorderly conduct), vagrancy, and public drunkenness are misdemeanors
rather than felonies.
So minimizing injury to our supremely (or secondarily) valued
interests is one of the two primary goals of the criminal justice system.
We established such a system (way back when) and maintain it largely to
discourage as many people as possible from committing crimes.33 But
how exactly do we go about doing this discouraging and minimizing?
The first thing we do is threaten the public with criminal punishment.
The (just) state tells the public what kinds of acts are legally forbidden
and what level of criminal punishment they may expect to suffer if they
still perform any of these forbidden acts and are caught. It defines what
it considers to be supreme-value-threatening and supreme-valuedamaging acts (including omissions and possession) as criminal offenses
and threatens criminal punishment for their performance. It does all of
this defining and threatening with the goal of deterring as many people as
possible from performing these supreme-value-hostile acts and thereby
minimizing (human-caused) threats to individuals’ enjoyment of their
supremely valued interests.34
Unfortunately, however, no criminal justice system can fully
eliminate crime.35 In every society, some individuals will simply not be
deterred by the threat of punishment. What, then, should the state do
with these individuals, at least those who are caught? The answer – and
the second means of fulfilling the goal of crime minimization (in
addition to making threats to punish) – is the state’s executing its earlier
threats to punish these law-breakers. The state’s actually punishing
criminals helps to minimize crime in three different ways: by (a)
temporarily or permanently preventing such criminals from committing
further crimes (incapacitation); (b) discouraging these specific
individuals from committing further crimes and thereby risking further, if
not worse, punishment (specific deterrence); and (c) discouraging many
other would-be criminals from committing crimes by showing, through
the example of these particular criminals, what will likely happen to
them if they are caught (general deterrence).36
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See Husak, Why Punish, supra note 16, at 459-62.
See VON HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 38; Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility
and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 90 (2005); John M. Darley, Kevin M.
Carlsmith, and Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35
L. & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165-66 (2001); Hampton, supra note 12, at 210-11; von
Hirsch, supra note 6, at 122.
35
See Stephen Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 267
(1999).
36
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
34
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B.

The Second Primary Goal of the Criminal Justice System:
Retribution

Is consequentialism correct that criminal punishment’s
contributions toward crime minimization are sufficient to justify criminal
punishment? The answer might seem to be an obvious yes until we
really consider just what criminal punishment is: the intentional
infliction of hardship, deprivation, or suffering by the state in return for a
proven violation of its criminal laws.37 Hardship, deprivation, or
suffering is not merely a foreseeable but unintended consequence, as it is
with (a) civil commitment,38 (b) administrative regulations,39 and (c)
medical treatment.40 Once again, hardship, deprivation, or suffering is
intended.41
The same, however, cannot be said of tort remedies. For this
reason, they are harder to distinguish from criminal punishment than are
civil commitment, administrative regulations, and medical treatment.42
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See BOONIN, supra note 4, at 7, 17; DUFF, supra note 12, at xiv-xv; HART,
supra note 16, at 4-5; HUSAK, supra note 12, at 92; David Dolinko, Three
Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1626 (1992); Feinberg,
supra note 12, at 73; Husak, Why Punish, supra note 16, at 455; Husak,
Retribution, supra note 16, at 963-64; Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out:
Dangerous Offenders and Preventive Detention, 27 L. & PHIL. 383, 408 (2008);
von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 118; Zaibert, supra note 20, at 110; see also
HAMPTON, supra note 21, at 126 (“I propose that the most general and accurate
definition of ‘punishment’ is: the experience of defeat at the hands of the victim
(either directly or indirectly through a legal authority).”); Dolinko, supra note
10, at 404-05 (critiquing Hart’s definition).
38
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-64, 368-69 (1997); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-539 (1979); FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 412-13;
HART, supra note 16, at 17; HUSAK, supra note 12, at 93.
39
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92-106 (2003); Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963); George L. Blum, State Statutes or
Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with
Authorities as Applied to Juvenile Offenders—Duty to Register, Requirements
for Registration, and Procedural Matters, 38 A.L.R.6TH 1, § 31 (Registration
requirement as nonpunitive) (2013); see also Romualdo P. Eclavea and Lucas
D. Martin, Sex offender registration statutes, 53 AM. JUR. 2D MENTALLY
IMPAIRED PERSONS § 126 (2013) (discussing sex-offender registration laws).
40
See State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 751-53 (La. 1992); People v. Fuller, 24
N.Y.2d 292, 302-03 (N.Y. 1969); Jami Floyd, The Administration of
Psychotropic Drugs to Prisoners: State of the Law and Beyond, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1243, 1272-78 (1990); E.M. Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners:
When Therapy Is Punishment, 45 MISS. L.J. 605, 608 (1974).
41
See BOONIN, supra note 4, at 12-17; HUSAK, supra note 12, at 92.
42
See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 783-84 (1997); Aman
Ahluwalia, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: The Search for a
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Like criminal punishment, tort remedies such as compensatory damages
and restitution are intended to make defendants suffer a deprivation –
namely, a deprivation of their money. But there are still two main
differences between tort remedies and punishment. First, tort remedies
are designed to fulfill two main ends: (i) deterring defendants and the
general public from committing the same kind of torts in the future and
(ii) restoring, as much as possible, the plaintiffs whom the defendants
previously injured to the condition that they enjoyed prior to injury. 43
While criminal punishment also aims to a large extent at deterrence, it
does not generally aim at victim restoration.44 Instead, it intentionally
inflicts hardship, deprivation, or suffering in order to achieve two other
ends (in addition to deterrence): giving the criminal what she deserves
and expressing condemnation of the criminal for her criminal activity.45
I will defend the former point (about just deserts) in this Part. Second,
while criminal punishment may amount to a fine, which superficially
resembles monetary damages and restitution, criminal punishment is
often implemented in other ways that tort remedies are not. These other
ways include incarceration, shaming, probation, community service,
license revocations, and loss of civil rights such as the right to vote and
the right to own firearms.
1. The Problem of Punishment
Given that the criminal justice system intentionally inflicts
hardship, deprivation, or suffering, one might very well argue that
criminal punishment simply cannot be just – no matter how much it
helps to minimize crime. On this view, no matter what the person’s

Limiting Principle, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 489, 491-92, 503-05
(2006).
43
See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 355 (2007); Steiker, supra note 42, at 784-85.
44
Some scholars, however, advocate shifting the criminal justice system’s focus
from retributive to restorative justice. See, e.g., BOONIN, supra note 10, at 21375; Bianchi, supra note 17, at 340; Carrie J. Niebur Eisnaugle, An International
‘Truth Commission’: Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to
Retribution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209 passim (2003); Lerman, supra
note 24, at 1664, 1674-75; see also Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tampering?
Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY,
AND CLEMENCY 16, 29-30 (Sarat, Austin and Hussain, Nasser eds., 2007)
(explicating and briefly critiquing the view that the criminal justice system
should strive for restorative justice rather than for retributive justice). Charles
Barton advocates a restorative approach that includes revenge. See BARTON,
supra note 21, at 137.
45
See supra notes 10 and 12 and accompanying text.
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crime, punishment is the morally wrongful response. This is what David
Boonin calls the problem of punishment.46
In response to the problem of punishment, one might continue to
stress the benefits, if not necessity, of crime minimization. But the
punishment abolitionist will maintain that no matter how great the social
utility of an institution, it cannot be morally legitimate if it is
fundamentally inhumane. (Consider, for example, slavery.) And an
institution such as the criminal justice system that intentionally inflicts
suffering for the sake of suffering is fundamentally inhumane.47
So in order to refute the punishment abolitionist, it needs to be
shown that the criminal justice system – in particular, the practice of
criminal punishment – is not inherently inhumane. According to
retributivists, if social utility will not help to demonstrate this point,
something else will: moral desert. What justifies criminal punishment –
intentionally inflicting suffering on criminals – is not merely its
significant contribution to crime minimization but also the fact that it is
what criminals deserve in virtue of their criminal wrongdoing.48

46

See BOONIN, supra note 10, at 1; see also DUFF, supra note 12, at xi-xii (“To
ask, ‘What can justify criminal punishment?’—the central question in
philosophical discussions of punishment – is to ask what can justify practices of
this kind. . . . The question of justification . . . is . . . a crisis of legitimacy: for
when we reflect on the punishments inflicted (in our name) on so many of our
fellow citizens and on the effects of those punishments on those who suffer
them, we cannot but raise the question of legitimacy—of what can justify any
practice of criminal punishment.”); HUSAK, supra note 12, at 92 (“I argue that
state punishment is hard to justify because it involves two essential features:
hard treatment and censure. Under normal circumstances, impositions of hard
treatment and censure violate important personal interests. Because ordinary
utilitarian reasons do not allow the government to infringe these important
interests, we have reason to countenance a right not to be punished. . . . [T]he
key to a theory of criminalization is to determine when the state is permitted to
infringe the right not to be punished.”); id. at 95 (“The criminal sanction is the
most powerful weapon in the state arsenal; the government can do nothing
worse to its citizens than to punish them. . . . As a type of response . . . criminal
sanctions are the most severe and therefore the most in need of justification.”);
Christopher, supra note 10, at 852 (“[P]unishment does require justification, for
the same reason we consider conduct violating the core prohibitions of our
criminal law to be wrong. Punishment involves the deliberate infliction of pain,
suffering, and deprivation, which is prima facie wrong.”) (citations omitted);
Dolinko, supra note 37, at 1626 (“Punishment involves the deliberate imposition
of suffering on persons convicted of crime; it involves treating these persons in
ways we ordinarily believe violate human rights (for example, incarceration and
execution). Why is it morally permissible to do these things (or at least some of
them) to criminals, when in most other contexts such treatment is morally
prohibited?”).
47
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48
See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Doug Husak argues that the task of
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According to retributivists, then, the state is justified in inflicting
criminal punishment not because of its presumed good consequences for
society, as consequentialists claim, and not because of its symbolic
importance, as expressivists claim, but simply because criminals deserve
it.49 This desert can take two forms: either a “moral debt” that only
criminal punishment can discharge50 or a right to criminal punishment
that the criminal “earned” through her commission of a crime.51 Both the
debt view and the rights view of criminal punishment presuppose that the
criminal is at least criminally, if not morally, responsible for her crime.52

justifying criminal punishment is to show not that it is morally permissible or
that it is morally obligatory but that it helps “the state more closely [to]
approximate the ideal of justice, and thus add[] value to the world.” Husak, Why
Punish, supra note 16, at 454; see also HUSAK, supra note 12, at 200-01 (“I
share [Michael] Moore’s judgment that the state of affairs in which [people who
commit monstrous crimes] receive their just deserts is preferable to the state of
affairs in which they do not (even though the former may not be intrinsically
good). I also concur with Moore about the crucial point that divides
retributivists from consequentialists: our judgments about these respective
states of affairs do not depend on utilitarian gains.”); Husak, Retribution, supra
note 16, at 984-85 (“The only benefit of punishing harmless wrongdoing is that
so doing makes ‘the world . . . a morally better place.’ But there are many ways
to improve the world; exacting retributive justice on harmless wrongdoers is
very low on any sensible list of priorities.”) (citations omitted).
49
See BARTON, supra note 21, at 10; BOONIN, supra note 10, at 85; FLETCHER,
supra note 11, at 415; Dolinko, supra note 37, at 1626; Rawls, supra note 10, at
5; Mackie, supra note 13, at 4.
50
See BOONIN, supra note 10, at 149-52; Bradley, supra note 16, at 20; Finnis,
supra note 21, at 99; Hershenov, supra note 12, at 86-94; Herbert Morris,
Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 483 (1968); Ristroph, supra note
16, at 1301. But see Mackie, supra note 13, at 5 (“It is often suggested that by
being punished, a criminal pays a debt to society. But how can this be, unless
what he suffers does some good to society? Reparation might be justified in this
way, but reparations are clearly different from punishments . . .”).
51
See BARTON, supra note 21, at 5; MOORE, supra note 10, at 150-51;
Christopher, supra note 10, at 864 n.113; Dais, supra note 17, at 112; Dolinko,
supra note 37, at 1642; Hershenov, supra note 12, at 79, 91-92; Morris, supra
note 50, at 485-86; Jeffrie Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on
Psychopathy, 82 ETHICS 284, 291-92 (1972); Christopher Slobogin, A
Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 30-31 (2003).
52
See Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury:
Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1, 19
n.68 (2012); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.1329, 1333 (2009); Dan M.
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 340 (1996); Ken Levy, Dangerous Psychopaths:
Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject To Criminal
Punishment And To Preventive Detention, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1299, 1345,
1363 (2011); von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 121.
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2. Proportionality
There are two kinds of retributivism: weak and strong.53 Weak
retributivism says that just deserts is a necessary condition of criminal
punishment, that criminal punishment cannot be just unless the person
punished committed criminal wrongdoing and is being punished for that
wrongdoing. Strong retributivism says that just deserts (criminal
wrongdoing) is a sufficient condition of criminal punishment.54 While
weak retributivism is accepted by all but a few radical consequentialists
who believe that it is sometimes (or even often) morally permissible to
knowingly punish an innocent person,55 strong retributivism is much
more controversial. There are at least two objections against it, two
arguments that mere just deserts is not a sufficient condition for just
punishment. First, other conditions – especially due process and all the
conditions that due process entails – are necessary.56 Second, there are
situations in which a person committed a crime and is afforded due
process but still does not deserve punishment, at least by the state. These
include situations in which the person committed the crime with a
recognized excuse or justification, the person has already been punished
proportionately by non-state actors,57 the person deserves forgiveness or
mercy,58 or the crime is de minimis.59
Given the minimality of weak retributivism and the two
problems with strong retributivism, I suggest that retributivists adopt a
“middle-of-the-road option” – moderate retributivism.
Moderate
retributivism says that (a) it is generally a good thing in itself (not
because of any expected consequences) if a person receives her just
deserts and therefore that (b) if a person commits a crime, then it is
generally a good thing in itself if, after receiving due process, she
receives proportional punishment for this crime.
Regarding (b), proportionality is built in to (moderate)
retributivism. Once again, retributivism is all about just deserts, and justness – or justice – implies proportionality.60 It is clearly not just but
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See MOORE, supra note 10, at 88-89, 153-154; Shawn J. Bayern. The
Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-Play Analysis of
Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV.1, 3 (2009); Duff & Garland, supra note 10,
at 7; Mackie, supra note 13, at 4.
54
See MOORE, supra note 10, at 83, 88, 91, 92, 104-105, 153-154, 173, 180.
55
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
56
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“. . . nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”).
57
See HUSAK, supra note 12, at 201-02; Husak, Retribution, supra note 16, at
972-73; Zaibert, supra note 20, at 100.
58
See discussion infra Part V C.
59
See Husak, supra note 14, at 350.
60
See Rawls, supra note 10, at 4-5; von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 115.
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unjust deserts – an injustice to the offender – if she is punished (far)
more than her crime merits.61 So a person who receives 25 years in
prison for stealing a $10 item may legitimately claim that her punishment
does not “fit the crime”; that – given the interests, values, and rights that
her crime tends to impair and the actual harm suffered by the victim –
her crime merits much less punishment.62 It is also clearly unjust – an
injustice to the victim – if the offender is punished far less than her crime
merits.63 So a defendant who is sentenced to only 30 days in jail for a
violent rape is not “paying” nearly what he “owes.”
In addition to justice itself, there are a consequentialist reason
and an expressivist reason for proportionality as well. Regarding the
former, disproportionate punishment erodes enforcement of, and respect
for, the law.64 To consider an extreme example, suppose that parking
tickets were punished by life in prison without parole.65 At first, it might
seem that this kind of law would fully eliminate all illegal parking. And
maybe it would – initially. But sooner or later, the conscience of the
community would step in and thwart enforcement of this law. The
public would stop reporting parking offenses, police would stop writing
parking tickets, prosecutors would stop trying recipients of these tickets,
and judges and juries would stop convicting parking-ticket defendants –
all of them out of fear of helping contribute to grave injustice.
Conversely, if serious crimes were under-punished – for example, the
statutory sentence for murder were reduced from a maximum of life in
prison to a maximum of one year in prison – judges and juries would
routinely nullify the statutory limit and recommend far greater sentences.
The expressivist reason for proportional punishment is simple:
to convey both to the criminal and to the community just how bad (or
grave or serious) her crime was.66 In general, the “message” conveyed
by harsher punishment is that the crime was worse than crimes that
receive lesser punishment. Still, it is important to realize that this nearplatitude oversimplifies the situation.
Most crimes prescribe a range of punishment, a range that allows
for judicial discretion. Three factors determine the statutory ranges: (i)
the relative importance of the interests, values, or rights that the crime
opposes or impairs; (ii) the punishment that other crimes receive; and
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See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991).
I leave aside the objection that she does deserve life in prison if this is her
third felony in a “three-strikes” jurisdiction because this is a different issue. See
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003).
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See MOORE, supra note 10, at 98-102; von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 125.
64
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453, 477-78 (1997); Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 2385, 2450-51 (1997).
65
See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (J. Powell dissenting).
66
See Hampton, supra note 13, at 13; Schopp, supra note 12, at 110; von
Hirsch, supra note 12, at 125.
62

19

(iii) the relative “rankings” of these crimes (for example, murder is
considered to be worse than burglary and burglary worse than criminal
trespass). So, in any given jurisdiction, the range of punishment for
murder is going to be harsher than the ranges of punishment for
attempted murder, rape, and burglary because, unlike these three other
crimes, murder violates the most important interest, value, and right we
have – life.
Once the range of punishment has been specified by statute, a
judge will determine how much punishment within that range a particular
criminal receives. But what determines the particular punishment that
the judge picks within this range? The degree of punishment that a
judge considers to be proportional to a given criminal act (within the
statutory range) will depend on three main factors: (a) the magnitude of
harm, if any, caused by the criminal act (for example, a $100 theft as
opposed to a $5000 theft); (b) various characteristics of the offender (her
age, mental condition, history, and reason(s) for committing the criminal
act); and (c) any mitigating, exculpatory, or justifying circumstances.67
The upshot of all this is that proportional punishment only
partially communicates the gravity of the crime being punished.
Statutory ranges, which are determined entirely by the community’s
(legislature’s) estimation of the gravity of the crime in the abstract, are
only the starting point, not the end point. For example, in the abstract,
we regard rape as a much worse crime than armed robbery. But given
the other factors that go in to determining proportional punishment, it
may very well be that some armed robbers are punished more harshly
than some rapists – even in the same jurisdiction. A defendant found
guilty of armed robbery might be given a harsher sentence (say, 15
years) than a defendant found guilty of rape (say, 10 years) because two
different judges, or maybe the same judge in two different cases, picked
two different points in the different ranges – a lower point in the rape
range and a higher point in the armed robbery range – on the basis of
different evaluations of the different harms that each crime caused and
the different circumstances under which each crime was committed.

III.

Two Reasons Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism
In this Part, I will offer two arguments for the central thesis of this
Article: retributivism does not work – that is, does not succeed in
explaining why we punish – unless we supplement it with
consequentialism. In Part VI, I will offer yet a third argument for this
conclusion.
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See generally von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 128-30.
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A. Why Do Retributivists Insist on Inflicting Just Negative Deserts?
If not for consequentialist reasons like crime minimization, why
are most people – and all retributivists (by definition) – so concerned that
criminals receive the punishment that they deserve in the first place?
Retributivists cannot answer this question merely by responding that the
state should give everybody, not just criminals, their just deserts. There
are two reasons why this response would fail.
First, it simply fails to capture a certain psychological
asymmetry. We are much more outraged to hear that a criminal suspect
is acquitted (for example, because of a procedural or evidentiary
technicality) or under-punished (for example, receives only a few years
in prison for a heinous crime) than to hear that an exceptionally virtuous
person was not sufficiently rewarded or praised, whether by the state or
by anybody else. In fact, we are not really outraged that the latter did
not receive the recognition and appreciation that she deserves. Instead,
we are – at most – mildly disappointed or sad or sympathetic. The point
is that whatever emotion we feel, it is much less negative and intense
than the emotion (again, outrage) that we feel toward the criminal justice
system’s comparable failure to give a criminal the punishment that she
deserves.
Second, the notion that we are concerned that criminals receive
their just deserts because we are concerned that all people receive their
just deserts is simply not true. The fact of the matter is that the modern
state is much more concerned that criminals receive their just – negative
– deserts than that the exceptionally virtuous receive their just – positive
– deserts. It has not set up any system or institution that is designed to
make sure that the exceptionally virtuous among us receive praise or
reward.68 To be sure, the military honors soldiers who show exceptional
bravery, and the government – or at least some government officials –
bestow lavish praise from time to time on various individuals who have
demonstrated exceptional achievement, generosity, or heroism. But,
again, we have no virtue justice system to complement our criminal
justice system, no state-mandated apparatus designed to make sure that
the exceptionally virtuous are found and given their just deserts (praise
and rewards) with the same zeal and solemnity that the criminal among
us are found and given their just deserts (blame and punishment).69
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B. The First Consequentialist Explanation: Practicability
Retributivists may respond that it is much more important for the
state to see to it that criminals receive their just deserts than that the
virtuous receive their just deserts. But it is not clear that they can defend
this point without resorting to non-retributivist – i.e., consequentialist –
considerations.70 As it turns out, the reasons for the state’s asymmetrical
emphasis on dispensing negative desert over positive desert are all
consequentialist.
First, when it comes to maximizing protection of our supremely
valued interests, which is (as we saw in Part II) one of the state’s main
concerns and duties, it is more important that it incentivize compliance
with the law than the performance of supererogatory deeds. Second, it is
much easier to determine when a criminal law has been violated than
when a given act is extremely virtuous. The former is, for the most part,
a question of objective fact; the latter is, for the most part, a matter of
subjective opinion because it requires two highly subjective judgments –
one regarding what the standards of virtue are (in the absence of any
“virtue statutes”) and the other regarding whether or not a given act
meets these standards. Third, there are (fortunately) many more
instances of virtuous activity than there are of criminal activity. As a
result, a virtue justice system, especially if it was concerned to treat all
equally virtuous people equally, would have to be immense – much
bigger than the taxpayers could afford – to fulfill the monitoring,
evaluation, and decision demands placed upon it.71
Again, these are all good explanations of why the state is not
nearly as concerned to bestow positive desert as well as negative desert.
But they are not retributivist explanations; they are not nonconsequentialist, desert-based reasons. By itself, then, retributivism fails
to explain why the state should be much more concerned to inflict
negative desert than to bestow positive desert.72 So we now have one
very good reason why retributivism must be supplemented by
consequentialism.
C. The Second Consequentialist Explanation: Revenge
There is yet a second reason why retributivism should be
supplemented by consequentialism. Most people agree that criminals
should receive their just deserts. But retributivists go further than merely
subscribing to this proposition. They have made this the very
centerpiece of their theory. They have assigned a higher status and
significance to just deserts than they have to any consequentialist
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desiderata (such as deterrence). The question is: why? Why are just
deserts so important? Why do retributivists feel so strongly that
criminals should get what they deserve?
Retributivists are likely to answer these questions with a single
word: justice. They want criminals to get their just deserts because they
want justice – pure and simple. But the kind of justice retributivists (say
they) want is not distributive justice, procedural justice, or restorative
justice. The kind of justice that retributivists want is – as their label
suggests – retributive justice. What, then, is retributive justice? What
does retributive justice mean? It cannot mean simply that criminals
receive their just deserts. There are two reasons. First, this explanation
would fail to distinguish retributive justice from either distributive justice
or restorative justice; both of these kinds of justice also involve giving
people their just deserts. Second, it would amount to a circular
explanation. If retributive justice just meant criminals getting their just
deserts, then to say that retributivists want criminals to get their just
deserts because they want justice is just to say that retributivists want
criminals to get their just deserts because they want criminals to get their
just deserts. This is not an explanation; this is an unhelpful tautology.
It remains to be explained, then, what retributive justice even
means (beyond criminals receiving their just deserts) and why
retributivists want it. My answer to these questions is that there is
nothing about the notion of just deserts itself that motivates retributivists.
In itself, the thesis that criminals should get their just deserts is a mere
truism, a virtually empty abstraction. Nor is it merely a brute,
inexplicable fact that retributivists want criminals to receive their just
deserts or regard criminals’ receiving their just deserts as an inherent
good, a positive value in its own right. The real reason why retributivists
so passionately adhere to this otherwise unmotivated abstraction is
because a powerful emotion pushes them toward it: vengeance.73
Retributivists – like many, if not most, human beings –
instinctively wish to return harm for (unjustified and unexcused) harm. 74
They – we – feel the urge to hurt another person who has, we feel,
unjustifiably and inexcusably hurt us. This desire for revenge is rooted
in the instinctive desire to maintain our supremely valued interests
against unjustified and unexcused injury by others.75 So when another
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person frustrates this desire, we naturally react with such negative
feelings as anger, resentment, indignation, and (sometimes)
humiliation.76 These feelings are not pleasant or comfortable. Like any
other kind of emotional suffering, we would prefer to discharge them as
quickly as possible.77 And the most effective short-term way to achieve
this catharsis, to alleviate or eliminate this emotional distress, is by
acting upon the urge to injure the perpetrator’s supremely valued
interests in turn, to show her how it feels.78 We feel tremendous
satisfaction in putting the perpetrator in the same position that she put us
(the victim). This turning of the crime against the perpetrator helps to
restore our sense of emotional equilibrium.79 And here’s the rub:
because achieving this emotional equilibrium, this righteous satisfaction,
is retributivism’s goal or objective, retributivism – once again – needs
consequentialism. Call this proposal that vengeance motivates both
retributivism and (therefore) criminal punishment the Motivation Thesis.
One might immediately object that the Motivation Thesis is just
wrong, that criminal punishment is not motivated by vengeance any
more than parental punishment is motivated by vengeance. When a
(good) father F punishes his son S – say, for hitting his older sister – F’s
purpose is not at all to exact revenge against S. While he may or may
not be angry with S, a desire to alleviate this anger by hurting S is not
what motivates F to give S a “time-out” or ground him. (And if this
desire does motivate F, then we may seriously call into question his
parenting and his character.) Instead, F is motivated by two other
desires: (a) the desire to educate S and (b) the desire to reform S.
Regarding (a), F wishes to teach S – through the “language” of
punishment – that he should not hit his sister. Regarding (b), F hopes
that the punishment will help to deter this kind of behavior – violence
against others – in the future. The same, then, can be said of criminal
punishment. It is designed solely to educate and reform, not to avenge.80
Put in slightly different terms, criminal punishment, like parental

who have caused harm. When a person has been a victim of cruelty, it is her
natural inclination to seek to victimize the victimizer. The criminal justice
system satisfies this desire by allowing the victim and society to act upon their
revenge through the imposition of harsh criminal sentences.”) (citations
omitted).
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punishment, is motivated solely by consequential concerns, not by
retributivist concerns; solely by the expected good consequences of
punishment, not by the gratifying prospect of seeing the guilty party
finally “get his.” It is easy to see why this is sometimes referred to as the
“paternalistic” theory of punishment.81
There is something to the paternalist theory. Certainly, criminal
punishment for harmless crimes – for example, drug possession, resisting
arrest, insider trading, and counterfeiting – is similar to parental
punishment insofar as the sole purposes of both forms of punishment
(with respect to the punished individual) are to educate and reform, not
to avenge. (I will develop this point further in Part VI.) But criminal
punishment for harmful crimes differs from parental punishment in at
least two ways. First, harmful crimes are generally much more serious
than most children’s worst wrongdoing. Of course, if a child commits a
crime – or an act that would be criminal if she were old enough – then
parental punishment may not be sufficient; the state may very well need
to get involved. But if the child’s anti-social action does not rise to the
level of a crime (or serious tort), then – by definition – it is not as serious
(harmful) as even a criminal misdemeanor. And corresponding to these
different levels of harm are different attitudes. While the parent’s
attitude in punishing the “lower-level” anti-social activity is purely
consequentialist, the criminal justice system’s attitude – or at least the
attitude of various people in the criminal justice system (especially the
prosecutors and the victims) – toward the “higher- level” anti-social
activity is partly retributivist.
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Second, (good) parents stand in a very different relation to their
children than does the criminal justice system to criminals.82 Because
the former generally love their children, they are much less likely to want
to see their children hurt for any reason, including avenging the harm
that they caused. On the other hand, the criminal justice system –
especially the prosecutors and the victims – typically do not stand in a
loving, nurturing relationship with offenders. On the contrary, victims
often bear nothing but anger and resentment toward criminals. And
prosecutors generally attempt to represent and vindicate these attitudes.
To be sure, there are situations when victims do stand in a loving
relationship with their assailants. Perhaps the best example is domestic
violence.83 Victims of domestic violence are much more likely than
most other kinds of victims to forgive perpetrators, blame themselves or
the police, and withdraw their complaints.84 But this kind of situation is
the exception, not the rule. In the vast majority of cases, cases in which
there is no loving relationship between the perpetrator and the victim,
forgiveness, self-blame, and withdrawal of complaints are much less
likely than anger, resentment, and a vengeful desire to see the perpetrator
“get his” for what he did.
D.Why Revenge Is Not Irrational
One might argue that revenge is nonsensical or irrational
because it tries to do what is impossible – namely, annul or undo the
harm that the criminal inflicted by turning the same kind or degree of
harm back on the criminal.85 This annulling or undoing is impossible
because the past simply cannot be undone.86 Even if the victim makes a
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full recovery, which is not always the case, she still suffered at least
some physical, psychological, or economic harm and had to spend at
least some valuable time and effort recovering from it.87 Indeed, the
objection continues, undoing the crime is impossible even in situations
where restitution can be made because there is still irreversible moral
harm, the harm of having one’s rights, humanity, dignity, and autonomy
violated.88 If, for example, a thief steals $5000 from a victim and is later
caught, the $5000 can, and might very well, be returned to the victim.
But because the initial violation, the stealing itself and the disrespectful
attitude that it represents, is in the past, it cannot be undone.
To be sure, it does seem rather strange that revenge should ever
bring about any emotional equilibrium in the first place. It is strange
because the emotional equilibrium does not seem to reflect any
metaphysical equilibrium. But this appearance is not quite right. When
the state punishes a criminal, it is not undoing the crime. That would be
establishing metaphysical equilibrium because it would involve changing
the past, which is impossible. Rather, the state is reducing the criminal’s
rights and powers to roughly the same degree that he previously reduced
the victim’s rights and power when he committed the crime. While the
perpetrator indicated through his crime that his rights and interests were
superior to his victim’s criminal punishment negates that message and
puts the perpetrator back into his non-superior – equal – position. By
restoring the equality between perpetrator and victim, by communicating
that the perpetrator’s rights and interests are not superior to his victim’s
rights and interests, criminal punishment helps to restore not
metaphysical equilibrium but moral and social equilibrium.89
The emotional equilibrium then follows this restoration of the
moral and social order. Given our peculiar moral psychology, the
victim’s knowledge that the criminal has been put as far below his prior
baseline as he previously put the victim below her baseline itself helps to
make her feel better about the entire situation. So revenge is not
irrational. It does not motivate us to try to undo what cannot be undone.
On the contrary, it very rationally motivates us to try to do the next best
thing to undoing the harms – namely, undoing the moral and social
inequality and bad feelings that these harms cause and represent. At the
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time that the offender committed the crime, she enriched herself in some
way – usually emotionally or financially – at the expense of the victim.
Retaliation in the form of criminal punishment helps to compensate for
this unjust enrichment by justly enriching the victim – specifically, her
relative moral and social status and emotional state – at the expense of
the criminal.90
E. Our Peculiar Moral Psychology
In the second sentence of the previous paragraph, I attributed our
vengeful satisfaction at seeing criminals punished to “our peculiar moral
psychology.” My point is that our widespread belief in retributive justice
is very much a reflection of our general moral psychology. Specifically,
our desire to achieve retributive justice – just deserts – is not sui generis
but is itself motivated by a deeper desire, the desire for revenge.91 We
believe that it is (a) just to punish criminals in proportion to the moral
severity of their crimes and (b) unjust not to punish them or to underpunish them not because (a) and (b) are self-evident principles or
because dispensing just deserts is obviously a good end in itself but
because we are the kind of beings who desire (proportional) revenge in
response to culpable causation of harm. Without this particular, if not
peculiar, psychological configuration, retributive justice would not be
justice in the first place. This is a point that most retributivists, who tend
to work entirely within the normative, non-psychological framework of
just deserts, simply miss.
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Of course, we can certainly imagine intelligent beings who react
to crime – that is, to deliberately inflicted injuries against their supremely
valued interests – either (a) with the same anger, resentment, etc. but
without a corresponding urge to retaliate or (b) not with anger,
resentment, etc. (and therefore not with a corresponding urge to retaliate)
but rather with sadness, regret, indifference, resignation, or forgiveness.
Indeed, we need not look to other species, extraterrestrial or earthly, to
find these non-vengeful beings. Some of them are human. People like
Mother Theresa, Martin Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Mahatma
Gandhi come to mind.92 How, then, do we account for this state of
affairs? If, as I am suggesting, vengeance is instinctive and therefore
universal among human beings, why do some, if not many, humans react
to some crimes with non-vengeful feelings?
There are several reasons. First, to say that vengeance is our
peculiar instinctive response to victimization is not to say that it cannot
be overridden by more powerful impulses or emotions that the situation
may trigger. Indeed, it is likely that most of us have sexual instincts.
But this hardly means that every situation – even provocative ones – will
equally trigger these instincts. Other forces such as socialization or
stress may counteract them. Second, in many situations, people are too
emotionally distanced from the victims. Even the most horrific crimes
rarely move most of us because we do not know the victim, and we have
(unfortunately) heard about too many other anonymous victims to invest
our emotions in any particular one of them.93 Third, to say that
vengeance is a powerful human instinct is not to suggest that it is deeply
rooted in all human beings to the same degree. Some are more vengeful
than others. Fourth, we can unlearn revenge, just as we can unlearn, or at
least learn to control, most other natural instincts. And this fact only
proves rather than refutes the point. The natural instinct was already
there; otherwise, there was nothing to be unleashed or controlled in the
first place.
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F. Nozick’s Distinctions Between Retribution and Revenge
The Motivation Thesis, which (again) says that vengeance
motivates both retributivism and (therefore) criminal punishment, should
strike the reader as both trivial and controversial. It is trivial to the
extent that the definitions of revenge and criminal punishment are so
similar. While criminal punishment is the intentional infliction of harm,
deprivation, or suffering by the state in return for a proven violation of its
criminal laws,94 revenge is a desire to inflict – or the infliction itself of –
harm, deprivation, or suffering in return for a perceived wrong or
injustice.95 Given these two definitions, it is hardly surprising to learn
that the latter (revenge) helps to motivate the former (criminal
punishment).
But the Motivation Thesis is still controversial. Despite the
similarity just noted between the definition of criminal punishment and
the definition of revenge, most – including retributivists – regard revenge
and criminal punishment with opposite attitudes. While most believe
that the institution of criminal punishment is a good thing (in theory if
not also in practice), they also think that vengeance is simply wrong,
something “primitive,” “mindless,” “barbaric,” “base,” “animal,” or
“cruel.”96 They argue that while we may be able to understand victims’
– and society’s – vengeful desire to retaliate against criminals, it is still
wrong for society to act on this feeling. We should no more act on it
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than we should act on any other understandable but ignominious motive.
Given this stark difference in attitudes toward criminal punishment and
revenge, it seems difficult to maintain that the latter motivates the
former.
Perhaps the most prominent defender of this view is Robert
Nozick. Nozick argues that criminal punishment bears a much closer
relationship to retribution than to revenge. While these two words are
often taken to be synonymous, Nozick makes five distinctions between
them:
1. Retribution is done for a wrong, while revenge may be done
for an injury or harm or slight and need not be for a wrong.
2. Retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of the
punishment, according to the seriousness of the wrong,
whereas revenge internally need set no limit to what is
inflicted. . . .
3. Revenge is personal: ‘this is because of what you did to my
______’ (self, father, group, and so on). Whereas the agent of
retribution need have no special or personal tie to the victim of
the wrong for which he exacts retribution.
4. Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in
the suffering of another, while retribution either need involve
no emotional tone, or involves another one, namely, pleasure at
justice being done. . .
5. There need be no generality in revenge. Not only is the
revenger not committed to revenging any similar act done to
anyone; he is not committed to avenging all done to himself. . .
. Whereas the imposer of retribution, inflicting deserved
punishment for a wrong, is committed to (the existence of
some) general principles (prima facie) mandating punishment
in other similar circumstances. . . .97
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If Nozick were correct, then one might very well conclude from
these distinctions that, contrary to the Motivation Thesis, it is wrong, if
not conceptually incoherent, to talk about the state’s exacting revenge for
an offender’s crime. On this view, only the victim of the crime or her
allies – i.e., non-state actors – can exact revenge. What the state exacts
when it punishes crimes is retribution.98
This Nozickian objection to the Motivation Thesis, however,
warrants several responses.99 First, thus stated, it is merely a semantic
point. When the state exacts revenge, we call it one thing (retribution);
when a private citizen exacts revenge, we call it something else (simply
revenge). Even if this semantic point is correct, it fails to rule out my
substantive point – the Motivation Thesis – which, again, says that
criminal punishment is generally motivated by vengeance against
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criminals for their criminal acts. None of Nozick’s five distinctions
explicitly rules out this possibility.
Second, a supporter of Nozick’s distinctions between retribution and
revenge might argue that they help to show not merely the descriptive
point that retributive punishment and revenge have different
characteristics but also the normative point that retributive punishment is
morally superior to revenge; that while retributive punishment is just,
revenge is unjust; that while revenge has a base goal or motivation,
retributive punishment has a much nobler goal or motivation. But
Nozick’s distinctions simply do not demonstrate this point. Nor do they
show that retributive punishment is motivated by something other than
vengeance. Indeed, the very meaning of the word retribution – namely,
a “requital according to merits or deserts, especially for evil”100 –
suggests as much. So it is not at all clear from Nozick’s distinctions how
retribution is supposed to be morally superior to revenge.
Third, contrary to Nozick, there are two very good reasons (in
addition to those I offered in Part III.C) to think that, even though
criminal punishment is inflicted by the state rather than by private
citizens, it is still motivated by vengeance. First, one reason why it is the
state – never the victim – that prosecutes criminals is because crimes are
considered to victimize not merely the individual victims themselves but
all individuals collectively. The society is victimized by the crime
insofar as the criminal is breaking its law and thereby implicitly
denouncing its moral values.101 So, even by Nozick’s distinctions above,
the state is exacting revenge – revenge against the criminal for
victimizing it.
The second reason for thinking that criminal punishment is
motivated by vengeance is that the state is acting in place of the victim.
It is helping the victim to do what she would ordinarily be powerless to
do on her own. It is, in this sense, the victim’s avenging agent, working
on her behalf to make sure that the person who victimized her gets the
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punishment that he deserves for victimizing her. By assuming victims’
burden of punishing the criminals who harm them, the state shows that it
shares and affirms the victim’s motivations, that it also wants revenge for
violations against its “client.”102

IV.

The Justification Thesis
Despite my responses to Nozick’s five distinctions between
retribution and revenge in the previous Part, one might argue that this is
all sophistry, that revenge is obviously just plain wrong and therefore has
no place in our criminal justice system. I offer two responses to this
point. First, as a psychological matter, retributivists who think that their
thirst for just deserts is not vengefully motivated may just be in denial.
Again, they may be thinking that revenge is something bad and therefore
cannot admit, either publicly or to themselves, to having vengeful
feelings, at least not in the context of their support for giving criminals
their just deserts. Second, if this first point is correct, retributivists need
not feel this way about revenge in the first place. This all-too-common
assumption that revenge is just plain wrong needs to be challenged. Of
course, revenge can be ugly. Below, I will discuss what is undeniable:
that revenge can be unjustified, misplaced, or excessive. But revenge
also has a good side. The ultimate task of this Part is to bring this good
side out.
Specifically, I will defend what I call the Justification Thesis.
While the Motivation Thesis says that revenge helps to motivate criminal
punishment, the Justification Thesis says (even more controversially)
that revenge helps to justify criminal punishment. According to the
Justification Thesis, revenge that is prompted by genuine injustice is a
very good thing; retributive justice just is righteous vengeance.103 I will
start by showing that the arguments purporting to show that revenge is an
unmitigated evil are weak. I will then argue – more positively – that
revenge is not only morally permissible but also morally justified and
therefore that the criminal justice system should reflect, as it does, this
(peculiar) feature of our moral psychology.
One thing I should make clear at the outset is that I am not guilty
of the “naturalistic fallacy.” That is, I am not reasoning from the way
things are to the way things ought to be. I recognize that even if the
Motivation Thesis is correct, it does not follow that the Justification
Thesis is also correct; that even if I am correct that vengeance is (a) a
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natural, instinctive reaction to culpable wrongdoing and therefore (b)
helps to motivate criminal punishment, it does not follow that vengeance
is a good or right reaction or that it should help to motivate criminal
punishment. In fact, one might argue the very converse: that while
vengeance is a natural, instinctive reaction to culpable wrongdoing, it is
wrong and harmful and therefore we should do whatever we can to resist
and overcome it.104 So the Justification Thesis has not yet been
demonstrated. It still requires arguments that are independent of the ones
that I have made for the Motivation Thesis. I intend to provide these
arguments in this section.
A. Arguments against Revenge
Those who think that revenge is morally wrong may not simply
assume this point, especially when others (such as myself) disagree with
it.105 They need to provide an argument for this conclusion.106 As it
turns out, the four main arguments offered against revenge tend to be
rather weak.
First, it is argued that religions repudiate revenge.107 For
example, the Bible (Matthew 5:38) encourages a person who has been hit
in one cheek to respond not with violence but by turning the other cheek.
But this argument is not very persuasive. First, such biblical passages
amount to undefended assertions, not reasoned arguments. Second,
while other biblical passages also repudiate returning an eye for an
eye,108 some of these – and other – biblical passages endorse divine
vengeance.109 Third, not everybody is Christian, no less religious.110
Arguments that are derived from religion or religious texts will fail to
persuade the vast secular among us.
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The second argument against revenge: revenge is impractical
because it helps to perpetuate the “cycle of violence.”111 Indeed, banners
and bumper stickers continue to replicate Mahatma Gandhi’s (or at least
India’s independence movement’s) maxim, “An eye for an eye makes the
whole world blind.” But poignant as this sentiment may be, it is not
always true. First, not all revenge involves violence in the first place.
Second, as an empirical matter, many acts of private revenge – and most
acts of state-imposed revenge (that is, criminal punishment) – terminate
the matter; they are not met with further retaliation.112
The third argument against revenge: it is often, usually, or
always for no good reason (unjustified), against the wrong person
(misplaced), or against the right person to a degree that is
disproportionate to the severity of that person’s crime (excessive).113
While revenge certainly can be any of these things, the risk that it will be
any of these things does not count as an argument against revenge itself.
It counts only as an argument against “misapplying” revenge; as an
argument not against revenge per se but against bad revenge – that is,
revenge that is unjustified, misplaced, or excessive.114 And there is no
good reason to think that all, no less most, revenge is bad.115 The proper
response, then, is not to condemn revenge per se. It is to condemn
unjustified, misplaced, or excessive revenge.
The fourth argument against revenge: even though tribalism is
instinctive, it is also wrong and therefore something that should be
resisted and repudiated rather than encouraged. Likewise, then, with
revenge. My first response to this argument by analogy, however, is that
it relies entirely on the assumption that both tribalism and revenge are
instinctive. And being instinctive is hardly sufficient for being wrong;
some of our instincts are clearly good or right or moral.116 So even if
tribalism may be wrong, it hardly follows that revenge is also wrong.
Tribalism may be wrong for reasons that simply do not apply to revenge.
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Second, it is certainly true that tribalism and (as I just argued
above) revenge can be wrong. But they are not always wrong. On the
contrary, there are two reasons to think that they are often right
(justified). First, both revenge and tribalism have served us humans well.
They are expressions of ancient traits that gave us an evolutionary
advantage. While tribalism reinforced group solidarity, which promoted
individual survival, revenge helped to enforce primitive rules protecting
life and property.117 Second, like revenge (as I will argue in the next two
sections), tribalism still has a rightful place in the modern world. We not
only tolerate but celebrate people’s loyalty and devotion to family,
school, community, team, culture, religion, and nation.118
I conclude that the extant arguments against revenge are weak.
In stark – and ironic – contrast, the arguments for revenge are strong. I
say that this point is ironic because, as I mentioned in the Introduction
and then again at the beginning of this Part, revenge is normally assumed
to be bad. In the next two sections, I will offer two arguments that the
desire for revenge in response to criminal wrongdoing is indeed justified
and therefore can itself help to justify criminal punishment.
B. The First Argument for the Justification Thesis
Whether or not we admit it, most of us accept and embrace
revenge in our everyday lives. We only half-jokingly parrot the wellknown sayings that “revenge is sweet” and a “dish best served cold.”119
We often say things like “It serves him right!” and “She had it coming!”
Bumper stickers proudly announce (and warn): “I don’t get mad. I get
even.”120 And we spend much of our everyday lives enjoying both
fictional and non-fictional accounts of karma, payback, the tables being
turned, settling scores, getting even, and unpleasant people getting theirs
across widely different contexts. Examples include a dominating sports
team’s being crushed; an unfaithful ex-lover’s being cheated on by his or
her new spouse; a wicked executive’s losing his wealth; an evil regime’s
being toppled; a ruthless corporation’s going bankrupt; a bully’s getting
pummeled; and wicked witches being crushed by flying houses and
melting into lifeless puddles. Few, if any, of us object to these vengeful
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satisfactions. On the contrary, most of us regard them as delicious,
refreshing, and highly entertaining; the stuff of great gossip, tabloids,
literature, and movies; and therefore at least morally permissible, if not
morally desirable.121
Given our acceptance – or at least cheerful toleration – of
revenge in everyday life, it is not exactly clear why some still believe
that it is morally impermissible to consider vengeance as a motivation for
criminal punishment. Why do they draw a line between permissible
revenge and impermissible revenge at the criminal justice system? Why
do they think that vengeful attitudes and actions are generally morally
permissible outside the context of criminal punishment but morally
impermissible within the context of the criminal justice system? Indeed,
if vengefulness toward non-criminals is acceptable in everyday life, then
vengefulness toward criminals should be all the more acceptable because
criminals tend to cause more serious harm.
In response to the questions raised in the previous paragraph, the
only two answers to these questions that come to (my) mind do not seem
terribly convincing. The first possible answer is that while it is certainly
morally permissible to enjoy bad people “getting theirs,” it is not morally
permissible to give bad people “theirs.” In other words, while a vengeful
attitude is morally permissible, vengefully motivated actions are not.
There is, however, no good argument for this position. Morally
speaking, if an attitude is justified, an action motivated by that attitude is
equally justified; conversely, if an action is not justified, then the attitude
is not justified either. It is not at all clear why we should make
exceptions to this general rule for vengeance.
A second possible reason for thinking that vengeance has no
place in the criminal justice system is that vengeance is harmless only
when it is “unofficial”; that our vengeful delight at the misfortune that
befalls bad but non-criminal individuals is morally permissible only
because it does not cause any further harm. Conversely, vengeance does
become harmful when we act on it in the criminal justice system. By
unleashing our vengeance there, significant harm is being done,
primarily to convicted criminals.
In response to this second proposal, as I argued in Part IV.A
above, revenge is harmful only when it is unjustified, misplaced, or
excessive.122 This is not to say that the criminal justice system does not
inflict unjustified, misplaced, or excessive vengeance. Unfortunately, it
does. But these mistakes are still much more contained than they would
be if private – or vigilante – justice were allowed or encouraged.
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Because the state is a more disinterested, less emotionally involved, party
than are victims, and because the state has appropriated from victims the
role of punisher, criminals are generally punished in a more careful, fair,
humane, and proportional manner than they would be if victims
themselves were allowed to take matters into their own hands.123
C. The Second Argument for the Justification Thesis
Feeling angry, resentful, indignant, and therefore vengeful
toward a blameworthy wrongdoer, especially a perpetrator of a harmful
crime, is actually morally superior to not having these feelings because
these feelings are ultimately rooted in sympathy for the victim and
respect for her humanity.124 We are, as Moore suggests, “vicariously
injured.”125 We feel angry, resentful, etc. at the criminal precisely
because she harmed the victim, a fellow human being. At the very least,
she committed a crime against her victim; this alone constitutes a moral
harm. And through this criminal act, she also caused her victim fatal,
physical, psychological, or economic harm. Again, if we have moral
sentiments – namely, respect for the victim as a person, a human being
whose rights, autonomy, and dignity were violated – we will react with
anger, resentment, etc.126 Because these feelings have moral motivations
behind them, they are moral reactions.127 It follows, then, that not to
react vengefully – to react with, for example, indifference, amusement,
(immediate) forgiveness, or even greater sympathy for the perpetrator
than for the victim – is actually insulting and therefore immoral.128
The following hypothetical helps to demonstrate this point.129 It
is a hypothetical of the third kind mentioned in the Introduction: nonpunishment with good consequences. Suppose that pharmacologists
have synthesized a drug that cures pedophilia. A convicted pedophile
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need take only one small, tasteless 20 mg tablet of “NoPed” with water
to immediately and permanently lose all of his illicit sexual desires.
Moreover, in addition to being 100% effective, NoPed has proven to be
100% safe. Nobody who takes it will suffer any temporary or permanent
side-effects. For this reason, the Food & Drug Administration (FDA)
has approved of NoPed as a treatment for convicted pedophiles.
Suppose further that 25-year-old “Pedo” has just been convicted
of soliciting and engaging in sexual acts with a 9-year-old girl
(“Victim”). Should Pedo’s sentence be a forced administration of
NoPed, after which he will be allowed to return to the community? Or
even if he takes NoPed, should he still have to spend at least a few years
in jail to “pay” for his crimes?
The proponent of the Justification Thesis – call her the Avenger
– will clearly opt for the latter.130 She regards Pedo’s moral debt as
twofold: not only (a) the physical and psychological harm that Pedo
inflicted upon Victim but also (b) Pedo’s malevolent attitude toward both
Victim and the law. Regarding (a), Pedo caused injury to Victim’s
supremely valued interests, her physical well-being and emotional wellbeing. Regarding (b), Pedo also caused moral harm; he showed
contempt and indifference not only for Victim but also for the law. By
treating Victim, a young girl, as a mere means to his own end, sexual
pleasure, he made it clear that he simply did not care what society thinks
is wrong and did not respect Victim as a human being with a right
against sexual violation.131 According to the Avenger, we simply should
not tolerate this kind of defiance. On the contrary, we should send our
own counteractive message right back at Pedo. We should convey to
Pedo, with righteous anger, that whatever he may think, society values
Victim and the law and laments the fact that Pedo broke it, the harm that
Pedo thereby caused Victim, and the cavalier, indifferent, and selfish
attitude with which Pedo wreaked all this havoc. The Avenger further
maintains that the only way in which society can convey this message
with sufficient force is through criminal punishment – in this case,
imprisonment. It is at this point that the Motivation Thesis (“payback”)
and expressivism (“teaching him a lesson”) come together.132
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In short, then, the Avenger will (correctly) rebel against the
prospect of Pedo’s victimizing Victim and then suffering no more than a
forced administration of a tasteless pill for his crime. Even if we could
be certain that all convicted pedophiles would be immediately cured by
NoPed, the Avenger will maintain that they would still need to suffer
proportional criminal punishment for their pedophiliac acts. Suffering
criminal punishment is the only way in which they could pay the moral
debt that they incurred when (a) they failed to notify the state that they
are a danger to children, (b) thereby failed to take the best preventative
measure (i.e., NoPed), and (c) ended up, for their own pleasure, selfishly
and callously sexually abusing their young victims.
Doug Husak suggests that “it is notoriously difficult to explain
why [our natural psychological reaction of disapproval or censure] is
widely regarded as” a ‘fitting’ response to criminal behavior.”133 But if
my account above is correct, then we have an explanation of this
psychological reaction. We find disapproval to be a fitting response to
criminal behavior because (a) criminal behavior either harms or threatens
to harm what we value most and (b) the offender thereby exhibits
contempt and disregard for our supremely valued interests.134

V.

Objections and Replies
In this Part, I will anticipate and reply to three objections – the
first two against the Motivation Thesis and the third against the
Justification Thesis.
A.

Objection 1:
Vengeance

Criminal Punishment Is Not Motivated by Collective

According to Objection 1, I have contradicted myself. On the
one hand, I argued in Part III.E that many members of society do not feel
much, if any, emotional reaction to particular crimes or criminals. I said,
“Even the most horrific crimes rarely move most of us because we do not
know the victim, and we have (unfortunately) heard about too many
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other anonymous victims to invest our emotions in any particular one of
them.” On the other hand, I also argued in Part III.C that one of the two
primary goals of the criminal justice system, to give criminals what they
deserve, is motivated by a desire for revenge against criminals. These
two propositions appear to be inconsistent.
Reply to Objection 1: They are not inconsistent. To see how they are
consistent, we need to recognize two distinctions. First, we need to
distinguish between individuals’ reactions to particular instances of
criminal wrongdoing and individuals’ attitudes towards criminal
wrongdoing generally. A person may feel vengeful toward criminals
generally without feeling vengeful toward any particular criminal. Put
enough of such people together, and we end up with an institution,
criminal punishment, that is motivated by collective, anti-criminal
vengeance in a society where most of the individuals do not necessarily
feel vengeful toward most of the criminals whom they read or hear
about.135 The institution of criminal punishment, then, symbolizes or
represents the collective vengeance just noted as well as the actual,
personal vengeance felt by victims, victims’ families, and those members
of society who do wish to see this or that particular criminal punished.136
Second, we need to distinguish between active and dormant
vengeance. Most of us do not have much, if any, emotional reaction to
the crimes that we read or hear about because, as suggested above, we do
not know the victims, no less the perpetrators. Just as importantly, we
also believe that the individuals who committed these offenses are more
or less being taken care of by the police, prosecutors, courts, and prisons.
But if the criminal justice system were somehow to break down and we
could no longer be as confident that criminals were being successfully
pursued, caught, tried, convicted, and punished, many more people
would likely experience much greater fear, anger, and – yes – vengeance.
Consider, for example, neighborhoods in which the police have
proven either unhelpful or ineffective at reducing such crimes as drug
distribution and gang violence. The majority of law-abiding citizens in
these neighborhoods do not generally regard this criminal activity with
indifference. On the contrary, they feel considerable anger – both at the
criminals for menacing them and at the police for failing to remove this
menace. Indeed, once this frustration and anger reaches a critical mass,
many of these neighborhoods “band together,” fight back, and do their
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best to remove the menace themselves, without the assistance of law
enforcement.137
As the very phrase “fighting back” suggests, these efforts at
restoring public order are fueled primarily by anger and vengeance. And
this anger and vengeance would not be felt in the first place if the law
were already being effectively enforced. It follows that this collective
anger and vengeance is already there, silently motivating the institution
of criminal punishment. It is just not consciously felt by many, if not
most, individuals until this institution fails to operate as usual. Then
their – our – “true colors” come out.
B.

Objection 2: Vengeance Is Too Harsh and Hypocritical

Jeffrie Murphy was perhaps the most prominent and outspoken
advocate not only for retributivism but also for the Motivation Thesis.138
In 2006, however, Professor Murphy softened his position and referred to
himself as a “reluctant retributivist.”139 Murphy is now reluctant, as
opposed to enthusiastic, about retributivism because he agrees with
Nietzsche that retributivism without reluctance – an unhesitant,
unwavering, enthusiastic, self-righteous desire to judge and punish –
tends to reflect an unhealthy soul, a soul that judges others too harshly
and itself too lightly.140 The unhealthy soul does these things because it
fails to take into account situationism: the theory that people’s behavior
is generated immediately by things generally thought to be in their
control – namely, reasons and character – and ultimately by things that
are out of their control and therefore a matter of luck: upbringing,
personality, cultural influences, and environmental circumstances.141
So, on the one hand, the unwavering, enthusiastic, self-righteous
avenger judges the wrongdoer too harshly because she ignores the factors
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outside the wrongdoer’s control – the bad luck – that helped lead to her
wrongdoing. Because bad luck tends to mitigate or excuse, ignoring this
element of bad luck in all wrongdoing is not only misguided and
uncharitable; it is cruel.142 On the other hand, the unwavering,
enthusiastic, self-righteous avenger judges herself too lightly insofar as
she fails to take into account her own good luck – the fortuitous
circumstance that all of the factors outside her control did not lead her to
commit the very same bad acts that she now so eagerly wishes to
condemn and punish.143
Rather than inferring from situationism that criminal punishment
is no longer justified, we need to strike a healthy balance between them.
And this is exactly what Murphy tries to do when he declares himself a
reluctant retributivist. He remains a retributivist; to this extent, he still
endorses blaming and punishing criminals for their criminal acts. But he
is reluctant to fully endorse this position because he recognizes that bad
luck plays a role in every criminal act. Murphy refers to these two
positions as the “Two Faces of Retribution.”144
Given his reluctance, why does Murphy even remain a retributivist
to begin with? Why doesn’t he abandon it altogether? According to
Murphy, while we must acknowledge the bad luck that lies behind every
crime, we must still blame and punish the criminal for this crime because
bad luck does not completely explain why she broke the law. (When it
does, the defendant is fully excused; too much bad luck is arguably what
all the traditionally recognized criminal law excuses – insanity, infancy,
hypnotism, involuntary intoxication, automatism, duress, necessity,
mistake (of fact or of law), and entrapment – attempt to capture.) To the
extent that bad luck does not play a part in the explanation of a given
criminal’s behavior – that is, to the extent that this individual knowingly
and voluntarily broke the law without a good excuse or justification – she
still does deserve to be convicted, condemned, and punished.145
Reply to Objection 2: In a nutshell, Murphy’s point is that while we
should indeed judge, blame, and punish, we should always keep in mind
when we do this judging, blaming, and punishing that there but for the
grace of luck go I. I fully agree with this (situationist) point. But
situationism still leaves as much room for vengeance as it leaves for just
blame and just punishment. In fact, it is the same room. Yes, the
criminal suffered from some bad luck. But so did the victim – at the
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hands of the criminal. So to the extent that the criminal does indeed
deserve blame and punishment for knowingly and voluntarily hurting the
victim – again, a point that Murphy still endorses, however reluctantly –
the criminal equally deserves the victim’s (and society’s) wrath and
vengeful desire for retribution.
C.

Objection 3: Forgiveness Is Superior to Revenge

According to Objection 3, the Justification Thesis is both false
and short-sighted. It is false because forgiveness is morally superior to
vengeance. And it is short-sighted because it prioritizes the most
effective short-term method for discharging the uncomfortable feelings
of anger, resentment, indignation, and humiliation over the most
effective long-term method for achieving this same satisfaction –
namely, by patiently waiting until the “rotten” feelings pass, at which
point we may feel more inclined to forgive the criminal for her
transgressions, to accept what she did without any accompanying
feelings of anger or a desire for retaliation. This long-term approach is
preferable for the same reasons that long-term planning is generally
preferable, all else being equal, to short-term planning: it generates
greater overall utility.146 As compared with vengeance, forgiveness is
psychologically healthier, and it does a much better job of promoting
reconciliation.
Reply to Objection 3: Objection 3 runs into several problems. First, it
simply assumes that the opposite of forgiveness – vengeance – is morally
wrong. But, as I suggested in Part IV, this assumption is false. So the
proponent of forgiveness over vengeance in the context of criminal law
is not entitled to it.
Second, because forgiveness often takes a very long time;
because most human beings are not that patient; and because many think
that some crimes are simply unforgivable, they tend to give up earlier in
the process and opt for the short-term method: vengeance, usually in the
form of criminal punishment. So a criminal justice system that generally
forgave criminals rather than punishing them would seriously frustrate
the (vengeful) public. It would, in most cases, fail to achieve the moral,
social, and emotional equilibrium that only criminal punishment can
yield.147
Third, especially for more serious crimes, only the victim, not
the state, is in a position to forgive the wrongdoer. It would be arrogant
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and insulting for the state to appropriate this prerogative from the victim,
the one who suffered the brunt of the harm.148
Fourth, the criminal justice system does not hold us to an
impossibly high standard. The criminal justice system does not require
us all to be saints. If it did, then most of us would be in jail. Instead, the
criminal justice system does just the opposite. It establishes a floor, not a
ceiling. It tells individuals within its jurisdiction the minimum that they
cannot drop below, not a threshold that they must rise above. We are all
free to be jerks; we just cannot be supreme jerks. That is, we are all free
to do such morally wrong things as lie to friends, send angry emails, and
“flip the bird” at other drivers. We will not go to jail for these acts even
though they fall below a proper standard of virtue. But we will go to jail
if we injure or attempt to injure others in much more serious ways –
ways that fall below a minimum standard of care that we owe everybody
else. So even if forgiveness were indeed the morally correct response to
all transgressions, the criminal justice system simply does not endorse or
reflect this (supposed) moral truth. It does not forgive, or recommend
forgiving, people for committing acts that fall below, or directly
contradict, the minimum standard of care.149
Fifth, a policy of forgiveness would lead to a dramatic increase
in crime because it would signal to all would-be criminals that they could
now commit crimes with impunity.150 For this reason alone, it would be
very foolish for the state to replace criminal punishment with a policy of
forgiveness.
Still, despite the five arguments above, forgiveness may be
advisable for the state with respect to some perpetrators in some
situations. For example, forgiveness may be appropriate when either the
crime is relatively trivial (that is, morally negligible and caused little or
no harm)151 or the criminal had an understandable reason for committing
it.152
Martha Minow also argues that forgiveness, or at least attitudes
and practices “between vengeance and forgiveness,” might be
appropriate for victims of mass atrocities (genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes). She offers three reasons: (a) there may be so
many perpetrators that the post-atrocity transitional state simply lacks the
resources to try and punish all of them; (b) trials, which tend to last
years, may perpetuate, if not exacerbate, societal divisions, thereby
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prevent the state from “healing,” and possibly even lead to renewed
hostilities; and (c) victims and their families will likely be
psychologically healthier if they can eventually bring themselves to
forgive rather than let themselves be consumed by insatiable hatred and a
desire for retaliation that may just never be realized.153
To be clear, this qualified defense of forgiveness in certain, very
specific situations should not be confused with a defense of mercy.154
Forgiveness and mercy are distinct in at least two respects. First,
forgiveness is an attitude, mercy an act.155 Second, those who advocate a
greater role for mercy in the criminal justice system are not advocating
that we increasingly forgive criminals. They still support continuing to
prosecute and punish criminals. They argue only that this punishment is
often excessive; that in our inherently imprecise calculations of just
deserts, we too often ignore or discount the complex social and
psychological conditions that cause many people to violate the law.156
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So to make punishments better fit the crimes, judges, jurors, and
legislators should develop a greater awareness of, and concern for, these
mitigating conditions and incorporate this awareness into the sentences
that they help to prescribe.157
While some have argued that this “pro-mercy” approach is
incompatible with retributivism,158 the fact that the pro-mercy camp still
advocates criminal punishment – indeed, fairer criminal punishment –
suggests that this approach is actually perfectly compatible with
retributivism.159 More importantly for my purposes, it is also perfectly
compatible with the Justification Thesis. One can be for both mercy and
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vengeance. Mercy is designed merely to prevent the vengeance from
spinning out of control, not necessarily to extinguish it altogether.

VI.

The Third Reason Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism:
Harmless Crimes
So far, I have argued that (a) society’s vengeful attitude toward
criminals who cause serious harm – fatal, physical, psychological, or
economic – largely explains why we wish to punish criminals (the
Motivation Thesis); and (b) because vengeance is an appropriate, moral
reaction to criminals’ injuring people’s supremely valued interests, this
sentiment also helps to justify criminal punishment (the Justification
Thesis). But there are three reasons to think that retributivism cannot by
itself fully explain and justify criminal punishment. The first two
reasons – both consequentialist – were already given in Part III. Both
explain why consequentialism does a better job than retributivism of
accounting for the fact that the state insists on inflicting negative desert
but not on guaranteeing positive desert. Once again, the first reason is
practicability and the second reason is vengeance, the need to channel
our vengeful impulses through criminal punishment in order to achieve
moral, social, and emotional equilibrium. In this Part, I will offer yet a
third reason for supplementing retributivism with consequentialism:
only consequentialism, not retributivism, can explain – and therefore
justify – our punishing certain harmless crimes.
Harmless crimes – or, more precisely, acts that do not necessarily
cause harm but are still criminalized – fall into two categories: (a) acts
that substantially increase the risk of causing serious harm; and (b) acts
that do not substantially increase the risk of causing serious harm.
Examples of (a) include the inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy,
solicitation, and reckless endangerment. Examples of (b) include drug
possession, resisting arrest, insider trading, and counterfeiting.
When I say that only consequentialism, not retributivism, can
explain and justify punishment of harmless crimes, I am referring not to
(a)-type (risky) harmless crimes but to (b)-type (non-risky) harmless
crimes. There are two reasons that retributivism does help to explain and
justify punishment of risky harmless crimes. First, once again, risky
harmless crimes substantially increase the risk of causing serious harm,
and this increase of risk may itself be considered a harm for which the
wrongdoer deserves punishment.160 Second, inchoate crimes often cause
psychological harm even when the object of the inchoate crime is not
achieved. For example, while the target of an attempted murder might
feel relieved that she is still alive, she may very well feel very distressed
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that she came so close to being killed. Likewise, a child who has been
solicited for sexual activity might be traumatized merely by the
solicitation even though no sexual activity actually ensued.161
Non-risky harmless crimes, on the other hand, do present a real
challenge to retributivism.162 Consider, for example, drug possession.
Suppose Cokie is carrying 10 ounces of cocaine in the passenger seat
while driving 30 miles per hour over the speed limit. The police pull
Cokie over for speeding. After Cokie rolls down her window, they
notice the bag of cocaine. They ask her what it is, she answers honestly,
and they arrest her for cocaine possession. Several weeks later, after a
brief trial, the jury convicts Cokie of cocaine possession. This seems to
be the correct result – at least the legally correct result. Cokie should be
punished because she culpably committed the crime of cocaine
possession.
Once again, retributivism says that that the desire to give a
criminal her just deserts motivates criminal punishment. Given this, it
seems, retributivism cannot explain why Cokie should be punished. A
desire to give Cokie her just deserts is not the motivation for punishing
her. Cokie’s “act” of possessing cocaine does not motivate punishment
in the same way that, say, murder or rape does; it does not “scream out”
for punishment. More generally, it is not because of anything to do with
just deserts that we have laws criminalizing the possession of drugs.
There is nothing intrinsically wrongful – and therefore intrinsically
deserving of criminal punishment – about possessing any drug.163
Instead, what is really motivating Cokie’s criminal punishment is
not the retributivist goal of giving her what she deserves but rather the
consequentialist goal of minimizing the risk of certain harms. There are
laws prohibiting possession of cocaine because they are thought to
contribute toward an overall good consequence – namely, minimization
of the dangers of cocaine use. Use of cocaine is dangerous because it
can lead to, among other things, anxiety, headache, high blood pressure,
sinusitis, severe depression, violent behavior, loss of consciousness,
tremors, hyperthermia, kidney failure, stroke, bleeding of the brain, heart
attack, seizure, suicide, and sudden cardiac death.164 So the state has a
significant (compelling) interest in deterring cocaine use and therefore
any and all activities that are necessary for, or contribute to, its usage.
And one such activity (or act) is possession.
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Still, in response to this objection against retributivism, I argue
that retributivism still can help, at least to some extent, to explain and
justify criminal punishment for non-risky harmless crimes like cocaine
possession. There are at least two different ways in which it can help to
provide this explanation and justification. First, recall (from Part II.B)
that weak retributivism is the theory that just punishment requires that
the person being punished both committed wrongdoing and is being
punished for this wrongdoing. Responsibility is a necessary condition of
all just criminal punishment165 even if it – or the desire to hold somebody
responsible – is not the driving motivation for certain kinds of criminal
punishment. By weak retributivism, then, Cokie deserves punishment. It
is not merely that she wanted to possess cocaine or fantasized about it.
She actually carried through on this desire, this carrying-through
violated a constitutional criminal law, and she is criminally responsible
for this act. Ex hypothesi, she knowingly and willingly acquired cocaine,
omitted to dispose of it, and does not have any good excuses or
justifications for this acquisition and omission.
Second, in addition to weak retributivism, there is what is called
“soft” or “limiting” retributivism (and sometimes “side-constrained
consequentialism”).166 This version of retributivism suggests that (a)
criminal punishment is justified primarily by consequentialism (the
benefits that it yields such as specific deterrence and general deterrence)
and (b) retributivism plays only a secondary role, which is to dictate an
upper limit on the amount of punishment that may be inflicted for any
given crime. Consequentialists who adopt this version of retributivism
are assuming three things: (a) the proportionality principle (i.e.,
punishment should fit the crime or at least not be grossly excessive), (b)
pure consequentialism does not entail proportionality,167 and (c)
retributivism is (therefore) necessary to make sure that the
proportionality principle is observed. As I argued in Part II.B.2,
however, (b) seems false. Once again, there is at least one good
consequentialist reason for proportionality: it contributes to more
effective enforcement of, and respect for, the law. And if, as I suggested
in the Introduction, expressivism is at least partly consequentialist, then
there is yet another (partly) consequentialist reason for proportionality:
to communicate both to the criminal and to the community just how bad
her crime was. Therefore (c) is false as well. So the fact that vengeance
plays no role in motivating (or justifying) criminal punishment for non-
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risky harmless crimes does not mean that proportionality does not apply
in this context. It still does – which just goes to show that the
proportionality principle does not entail the Motivation Thesis, no less
the Justification Thesis.

VII.

Conclusion
This paper confronts an age-old question: why do we punish?
And there are some age-old answers – the two primary ones being to
give criminals their just deserts and to help minimize future crimes.
Because these two theories – retributivism and consequentialism – aim at
two separate goals, they do not necessarily always coincide. Sometimes
one goal may be satisfied only at the expense of another. Scholars have
exploited this situation to argue for one theory over the other theory – as
if one theory is correct and the other incorrect. The fact of the matter is
that while retributivism and consequentialism certainly can come into
conflict in very rare situations, they normally do not. On the contrary, if
we are to explain justify criminal punishment, the intentional infliction of
harm, deprivation, or suffering – a state of affairs that is presumptively
unjustified – we need both retributivism and consequentialism.
In this Article, I have tried to show just why this is the case. One
concept that links the two – however much both consequentialists and
retributivists repudiate it – is revenge. The retributivist imperative of
giving criminals their just deserts – punishment – is itself largely
motivated by our need to restore the moral and social balance (order) and
thereby re-establish victims’ emotional equilibrium. But fulfilling these
needs – an excellent consequence – is a consequentialist goal. So
beneath retributivism lies consequentialism. They are joined from the
outset.
They are also joined at the peripheries of criminal law. Some
harmless acts are criminal, and therefore punishable, even though they do
not arouse our vengeance. Retributivism, which is fueled by vengeance,
does not explain and justify this kind of criminal punishment. It explains
and justifies only criminal punishment of crimes that arouse vengeance –
that is, harmful and risky harmless crimes. We punish all the rest – all of
the non-risky harmless crimes – strictly for consequentialist reasons.
Still, just deserts is not entirely irrelevant here. Just deserts still comes
into play – not as the motivation or the justification of punishment but
rather as a means of determining proportional punishment.

